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Abstract. There have been several well publicized incidents over the past few 
years in refinery and petrochemical facilities. Incident reports from amongst 
others, the Chemical Safety Board and papers from ARC and Marsh McLennan 
Insurance Company show that many of these incidents can be attributed to 
operational errors. On closer examination of possible actions during a crisis, 
such as mistakes due to confusion and time taken to understand the value of 
information being presented, it begs the question - “Are Machines Better than 
Humans in a Crisis”. In fact, could technology provide better safety and 
business benefits? On November 4th 2010, Qantas Airlines flight 32, an Airbus 
A380, took off from Singapore to Sydney en route from London Heathrow. At 
the time, the A380 was the world’s largest and most technically advanced 
airliner. Not long after take-off over Indonesia one of the engines exploded. The 
incident report said that had there not been five experienced pilots on board that 
day, the plane could have crashed. Thankfully they saved the aircraft which 
landed back in Singapore. The conclusion was that the balance of advanced 
technology and human thinking saved the day. In essence, in a stressful 
situation both humans and machines have a role to play.  
Keywords: Operator Mental Workload, Decision Support, Standards, Alarm 
Management, Procedure Management, Human Machine Interface Management 
1   Introduction 
This paper aims to show how standards can help to alleviate operator mental 
workload in industrial applications during times of stress, especially during abnormal 
operations. It presents possible areas for future research. 
Operator error has been put forward as one of the causes of many major incidents 
in the recent past, but incident reports show that this is often the result of bad 
procedures, lack of training and the lack of enough resources in times of abnormal 
operations. It can be shown that with the right skills and tools, a good operator can 
help to avoid these situations. Probably the most advanced decision support systems 
may be found in the aircraft industry, but even these can go wrong sometimes and it 
comes back to the skills and training of humans to avoid potential disasters. In this 
																																								 																				
1 This paper is based on a paper presented at the 2014 SPE Intelligent Energy Conference [1] 
paper some of these incidents will be examined and a standards-based approach 
presented that may provide help in future situations. 
During normal operation, processes run mostly untouched by operators, especially 
in continuous plants. But in an incident, there is too much information, which 
increases operator mental workload and so they can become confused and make 
mistakes. Humans are not designed to cope with masses of information, especially 
when they are under stress. Start-ups and shutdowns of process units are considered to 
be ‘normal’ operations, along with grade changes and other transitions, however these 
are amongst the more error prone operations that again increase the mental workload 
of operators. 
2   Case Study: Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven 1994 
A clear example of extreme operator mental overload happened on Sunday 24 July 
1994, when a lightning strike started a fire on the crude distillation unit (CDU), which 
eventually led to an explosion on the fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU). Although 
the media put the blame on the lightning strike, the incident report [2] stated that 
“these events, though significant in initiating a plant upset, were not the cause of the 
release and explosion that occurred five hours later. These consequences resulted 
from subsequent failures to manage the plant upset safely”. Luckily, although there 
were some serious injuries, no one was killed. 
Amongst many other things, the report cited bad alarm management, bad display 
design and a failure to follow procedures. For example, it stated “From the limited 
amount of alarm information relevant to the event which was preserved from just one 
of the journals, it was seen that in the last 10.7 minutes before the explosion the two 
operators had to recognise, acknowledge and take appropriate action on 275 alarms. 
At times during the morning operators were doing nothing but acknowledging 
alarms”. It went on to say that the chances of operators restoring control manually 
were reduced as the incident progressed due to them being overloaded by a “barrage 
of alarms”. There were 2040 alarms configured and of those in the distributed control 
system (DCS) 87% were high priority. During the incident, the operators had to cope 
with alarms coming in a rate of one every 2-3 seconds, which resulted in many being 
cancelled due to their nuisance. There was no evidence that a vital high level alarm on 
the flare drum what went off 25 minutes before the explosion was ever seen. 
In addition the report indicated that the FCCU graphics were not designed in a way 
to help the operators to control the process. There were limited amounts of process 
data and colour was not used in a way to highlight important data. It also said that 
there was information on the graphics, such as the structure of plant items, which had 
no relevance to plant operation and shouldn’t have been there.  Finally, several 
procedures had fallen into disuse from lack of practice and documenting them. I will 
discuss later how standards and better design could maybe have helped in this 
incident. 
3   Managing Mental Workload in a ‘Life or Death’ Incident 
Having several very skilled “operators” probably saved Qantas flight 32 on November 
4th, 2010. The flight operated by an A380 Airbus – the largest and most technically 
advanced passenger aircraft in the world at the time had left Singapore for Sydney, 
when over Indonesia one of the engines blew apart; figures 2 and 3 show the extent of 
the damage. In fact, the damage to the wing shown in figure 3 rendered almost the 
entire wing controls inoperable. 
 
Fig. 2. Engine Damage                                         Fig. 3. Damage To Wing 
The pilots were inundated with messages – 54 came in to alert them of system 
failures or impending failures but only 10 could fit onto the screen. The pilots 
watched as screens full of messages came in. Luckily on that flight there were five 
experienced pilots including three captains who were on “check” flights. Even with 
that much experience on board it took 50 minutes for the pilots to work through the 
messages and prioritize them to find the status of the plane. The incident report said 
that without those pilots it’s possible the flight would not have made it. In fact, the 
‘airmanship’ of the pilots saved the plane. If the pilots had followed ALL the advice 
of the flight systems the plane would have crashed. The most senior pilot told the 
others to read the messages but ‘feel’ the plane. They managed to land the plane with 
only one of its four engines in full working order.  
Many pilots are also chosen due to their ability to handle stressful situations calmly 
and they go through extensive mental workload training on simulators, covering every 
kind of incident that could happen. In fact on the ‘Miracle on the Hudson’ US 
Airways flight 1549, which landed safely on the Hudson after a bird strike on January 
15th, 2009, none of the crew had ever met each other, but their calmness and following 
procedures to the letter, saved the plane and many lives. 
4   Finding a Way to Help Operators under Mental Stress 
From the Qantas and US Airways incidents, it’s clear that humans and machines have 
a role to play in crisis situations. On the one hand, systems can help and also the 
person’s individual character matter, but we may ask if it would be possible to take 
the human out of the equation. The theoretical answer to that is yes. It is possible to 
run a process plant without operators and to fly a plane without pilots but would 
anyone fly on such an aircraft?  
Can we use machines to guide humans and the deductive power of humans (given 
a logical number of options) to make the correct decision? Mary L. Cummings, 
Director of the Humans and Automation Laboratory (HAL), at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) and a former Navy F-18 pilot, who is doing research 
into human-automated path planning optimization and decision support has said [3] 
“Humans are doing a pretty good job, but they do it even better with the assistance of 
algorithms” and “This research is really showing the power of how, when algorithms 
work with humans, the whole system performs better.” Hence, letting computers 
analyse masses of information generated during an incident and giving the operator 
options as to how to alleviate the incident, may help to manage the mental workload. 
Humans have emotions and get stressed. There is no better example of this 
happening than in a crisis, as shown above in section 2. Some humans are able to 
handle crises in a very calm way, as shown by historical heroic efforts in war and 
peace, but the majority tends either to try to do everything, panic or just switch off. So 
when even the best operator is faced with many alarms coming in at the same time 
and other things happening around him, he will likely try to look at as many as he can 
and work out a scenario and possible solution, but that may be too late. It would be 
much better if the system provided him with options and guidance – or decision 
support. 
5   Standards Based Decision Support Helping Mental Workload 
Decisions are made by assessing the problem, collecting and verifying information, 
identify alternatives, anticipating consequences of possible decisions and then making 
a choice using sound and logical judgment based on available information. 
Few humans in a crisis are able to do this without help. Either they find it difficult 
to manage the situation to give them time to gather enough information to make a 
sound decision or they just run out of time trying to make the decision. With decision 
support and guidance this task becomes more manageable. 
In key areas such as human machine interface design, alarm management and 
procedure management basic decision support may be developed. In support of this, 
industry standards are either available or being developed. For now, I am going to 
concentrate on The International Society for Automation (ISA) and The American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), globally recognized standards development 
organizations, which are developing standards based on the three areas mentioned 
above and they are providing or will provide a good basis for decision support: 
• ANSI/ISA-18.2-2009 – Management of Alarm Systems for the Process 
Industries 
• ANSI/ISA-101.01-2015 – Human Machine Interfaces for Process Automation 
Systems 
• ISA–TR106.01 – Technical Report: Procedure Automation for Continuous 
Process Operations – Models and Terminology 
• ISA–dTR106.02 Working Draft 16 – Technical Report: Procedure Automation 
for Continuous Process Operations – Work Processes 
ANSI/ISA-18.2, which has been a standard since 2009, provides requirements and 
recommendations for the activities of the alarm management lifecycle. The lifecycle 
stages include philosophy, identification, rationalization, detail design, 
implementation, operation, maintenance, monitoring & assessment, management of 
change, and audit. Using this standard should prevent incidents like the one at Texaco 
Milford Haven. Alarms are rationalized and prioritized so that high priority alarms 
either trigger an action or are responded to urgently. 
ANSI/ISA101.01 is directed at those responsible for designing, implementing, 
using, and/or managing human-machine interfaces (HMI) in manufacturing 
applications. The standard itself has internal standards aimed at producing a HMI 
philosophy, HMI style guide and HMI toolkit, all of which should lead to a design 
that is helpful to the operator.  
The ISA106 committee has produced one technical report defining models and 
terminology and is close to releasing a second on work processes, before starting the 
process of developing a standard. The standard helps to define which procedures 
should be automated and under what circumstances. 
When combined together these three standards offer a powerful tool to provide 
decision support in times of normal and abnormal operations. In a March 2017 
interview [4] with Bonnie Ramey of DuPont, Greg MacMillan and Stan Reiner of 
Control magazine discuss how the tight integration between ISA18.2 and ISA101 can 
aid the safe operation of processes.  
6   Standards Working in Harmony for Decision Support 
If configured correctly, well planned alarms could trigger procedures in many 
abnormal situations and a well-designed human machine interface could bring a 
developing incident to the attention of the operator in a timely manner, as shown 
below in Figure 4; this is called Advanced Decision Support (ADS) [5]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Standards Based Decision Support 
Alarm management should limit alarms to what the operator has time and ability to 
handle by developing an alarm philosophy and rationalization program. The alarms 
should then be continuously monitored and optimized. In that was we can ensure the 
right alarms are detected and then either the operator or the system can take action. 
With good HMI management, the operator displays are designed based on operator 
tasks, incorporate human factors such as colour, layout and navigation. They should 
provide situation awareness through trends and profiles and provide clear indications 
of items that need attention. 
Finally, procedure management can help the operator to put corrective actions in 
place or actually take corrective actions automatically. It can also prevent actions 
from taking place if the initial set up is not correct for a start-up or transfer and so on. 
The airline industry is amongst the safest and most automated in the world – in fact 
most modern aircraft would not be able to fly without the use of computer guidance, 
yet procedures play a big part in the way aircraft are operated. Pilots need to go 
through many procedures before, during and after a flight. 
The first recorded procedures were introduced by test pilots in 1935 [6] after a 
crash of the B-17 Flying Fortress almost caused the program to be abandoned due to a 
gust lock still being engaged at take-off. It was said that the plane was too 
complicated to fly. The test pilots developed procedures for take-off, flight, before 
landing and after landing. Boeing delivered 12 of the aircraft to the Air Corps and 
they flew 1.8 million miles without a serious mishap. Every type of plane from small 
private planes to the largest jumbo jet now uses procedures for all aspects of the 
journey and not following them could lead to a pilot losing his license to fly (or 
worse).  
In the same way the start-up and shutdown of a process requires standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) which are designed to ensure the process is started up or shut 
down the same way each time. However, these are sometimes ‘modified’ by 
experienced operators who may see a better way of doing things. In the case of both 
the pilot and the process operator, there are ways that these improved procedures 
should be evaluated and turned into current practices. In the case of an aircraft, the 
consequences of not doing this are obvious, but in a process plant, a tweak here and a 
tweak there may go unnoticed until things go wrong. As with the operation and 
maintenance of aircraft, the goal of operations and decision support is to capture the 
knowledge of the best and hopefully calmest operator on his/her best day under all 
conditions. 
Figure 5, below, depicts the methodology for capturing best practices procedures. 
The goal of this approach is to “distil” best operating practices and find the right 
balance between manual, prompted and automated procedures, documenting and 
implementing the procedures and then executing continuous improvement cycles on 
them. Automating every procedure does not always provide the best solution; neither 
does manually executing every procedure. What does provide the best solution is to 
consciously examine events that caused production interruptions, then examine the 
procedure operations associated with those events, document them and determine 
what type of implementation will provide the best economic return while improving 
safety, health and the environmental metrics for the facility. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Capturing Best Practices Procedures 
A modular procedure consists of logical steps and as shown in Figure 5, each 
operator has started with the same SOP but has modified it to handle different 
situations and styles of operating by adding additional steps.  On the right-hand side is 
the resultant “best-practice” procedure. 
7   Texaco Refinery, Milford Haven Revisited 
Now let’s revisit the Texaco Milford Haven refinery incident. In terms of a set of 
circumstances where the system could have potentially provided the operators with 
the correct information at the right time and possibly even taken corrective actions, 
this was a ‘perfect storm’.  
Texaco had a DCS, but while the technology didn’t exist at that time to provide the 
kind of highly optimised HMIs that we have today, many things could have been done 
to reduce the operator mental workload and possibly have avoided the incident. 
Alarm management could have reduced the number of high priority alarms so that 
those that activated were timely and did not overload the operator and if many 
activated at the same time, the system could have identified the possible ‘main actor’ 
enabling the operator to take action, or even taking action itself. For instance, the flare 
drum high alarm that was missed could have triggered a procedure. 
These days we have better historians and data analysis tools, able to identify 
incidents as they start to occur and we can use intelligent displays to help the operator 
to see where the main activities need to take place. 
Procedures should have been followed and the incident report recommended 
improved training and document keeping. But again today, a procedural assistant 
could give clear communications regarding; 
• What was transpiring as the incident unfolded 
• Next steps according to approved safety procedures 
• Safety hazards associated with missteps 
The incident report cited the inability of the operators to be able to carry out mass and 
volume balances. A procedure assistant could have helped with this and triggered 
actions or prompts as a result of an imbalance. 
8   Can Standards Based Decision Support Help Mental Workload 
in a Crisis? 
In the human factors section of the Texaco Milford Haven refinery incident report, 
one of the key factors mentioned was that the preparation of shift operators and 
supervisors for dealing with a sustained 'upset', and therefore stressful, situation was 
inadequate and that better overview facilities should have been provided. 
This paper has shown that issues often exist with humans in the workplace during 
times of crisis and stress. In some cases having the right human (or humans) in the 
right place can be beneficial – and often this is the case. But we need to be prepared 
for the situations where the operator gets overloaded, takes things for granted or an 
inexperienced operator is working at the time things start to become unstable. 
In times of abnormal operations, systems are configured to produce lots of data – 
humans are not configured to handle or interpret it. However, when presented with the 
right information, in the right context, during an abnormal condition, humans are able 
to do things machines cannot. They can evaluate the situation and provide the 
“thought process” on what action to take, with the guidance and support of automated 
systems. 
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